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JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS:
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE
W ITH THE DECISION of Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co.' the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court has for the first time constitutionally approved an
application of North Carolina's innovating statutory provision, G.S. 55-
145(a)(3),2 governing the jurisdiction of its courts over foreign cor-
porations. That novel section reads as follows:
A foreign corporation may be subject to suit in a state court by a resident of
North Carolina on any cause of action arising:
(3) Out of the production, manufacture, or distribution of goods by such
corporation with the reasonable expectatioh that those goods are to be used or
consumed in this State and are so used or consumed, regardless of how 'or
where the goods were produced, manufactured, or sold or whether or not
through the medium of independent contractors or dealers.
In the Rheem case, the. third decision to interpret the above statute,
the plaintiff, a North Carolina resident, sued in North Carolinap to
recover for personal injuries caused by the explosion of a *gas water
heater, alleged to have been negligently manufactured. The defendant,
a California corporation, sold its products to wholesale purchasers in
North Carolina but had not been formally admitted to transact business
within the state. As a pkrt of its operations, the defendant corporation
employed three agents to solicit orders in North Carolina. Two of
these agents lived in the state and all obtained at least fifty per cent of
their orders there. All orders were finally accepted by Rheem outside
North Carolina. The ruling of the lower court denying a motion to
2z49 N. C. 454, xo6 S.E.2d 704 (1959.
'The purpose of this statute, as expressed by the draftsmen, is to extend corporate
jurisdiction in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). This extension is based on the policy that it is
better to extend jurisdiction than to compel state residents to sue in foreign jurisdictions.
Latty, Powers, and Breckenridge, The Proposed North Carolina Business Corporation
,c4, 33 N.C.L. REv. 26 (1954).
* Process was served on the Secretary of State under GEN. STAT. § 55-146 (Supp.
1957). This statute provides that the Secretary must mall a copy of the process to the
address of the corporation. This type of non-resident service is authorized by GEN.
STAT. § 55-I45(c) (Supp. 1957), which makes the Secretary of State the agent of any
corporation subject to suit under GEN. STAT. § 55-145.
'Moody's Industrial Manual 8o6 (1958).
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dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed on appeal, both courts re-
lying on G.S. 55-145(a) (3) to find jurisdiction over the defendant. In
arriving at this conclusion, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated
that the two previous cases which held this section of the statute uncon-
stitutional in application as violative of due process,5 were distinguish-
able on their facts; but no attempt was made by the court to delineate
these factual distinctions.
The curt dismissal of Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills,"
and Putnam v. Triangle Publications Inc.,' as being factually inappli-
cable, justifies another look at these two cases. The Erlanger case
involved a suit by a North Carolina corporation against a New York
corporation to recover damages for-a shipment of defective goods. The
order for these goods was placed and accepted in New York, and the
goods were shipped f.o.b. New York. The suit, originally filed in a
North Carolina state court, was later removed to a federal district court
sitting in North Carolina. A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
was granted on the ground that an application of G.S. 55-I45(a)(3).
to the particular facts would violate due process, since the "minimum
contacts" test8 laid down by International Shoe Co. v. Washington9
would not be satisfied thereby.
a Any judgment rendered against a corporation over which a court has no jurisdic-
tion is void as a violation of due process. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (x877).
Originally, it was held that jurisdiction could be obtained over a corporation only in
the state of incorporation. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 03 Pet.) 517, 588
(x839). Because of the increasing expansion and complexity of corporate activity, this
position became untenable and theories of "implied consent" and "presence" were de-
veloped. Under these theories, a state could exert jurisdiction over foreign corporations
whenever the corporation was "doing business" in the state. St. Clair v. Cox, xo6 U.S.
350 (1882) ; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); Green v.
Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., zo5 U.S. 530 (i9o6). However, in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 3o (1945), the Supreme Court characterized the (1presence"l
theory as begging the question and the "implied consent" theory as a legal fiction. As
a substitute for these tests of jurisdiction, the Court laid down what has come to be
known as the "fairness" or "minimum contacts" test.
6 239 F.zd 502 (4 th Cir. 1956). 7 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957)-
' "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi-
tional notion of fair play and substantial justice.' International Shoe Co. v. Washing-7
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 36 (1945). Those demands may be met by such contacts of the
corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our
federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit
which is brought there., An "estimate of the inconveniences" which would result to
the corporation from a trial away from its "home" or principal place of business is
relevant in this connection. Id. at 317.
9 326 U.S. 310 (945).
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The determination that the facts of the Rheem and Erlanger cases
are distinguishable is easily supportable. In the Erlanger case, the con-
tract sued upon was made outside of North Carolina, and the defendant
had never previously done business in North Carolina. 0 The rather
extensive activities of Rheem, on the other hand, had been continuously
and systematically conducted in North Carolina for several years. Illus-
trative of the substantial nature of Rheem's operations in the state is the
$i,685,i13.92 volume of business transacted by Rheem there during
the last fiscal year. Courts have traditionally been more willing in tort
than in contract cases to extend the scope of the jurisdiction concept."
Accordingly, the fact that the Erlanger case dealt with an alleged
2039 F.2d 5o, 505 ( 4 th Cir. 1956).
"The Supreme Court first recognized the hardship inherent in compelling a plain-
tiff to sue in a foreign court to recover for injuries arising out of an automobile acci-
dent in the case of Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1977). The Court in allowing
jurisdiction of a non-resident stressed the dangerous nature of the driving of an auto-
mobile within the state. This seems to be the first real extension of in personam juris-
diction, and it is clear that but for the tortious nature of the case jurisdiction would not
have been granted.
ince the decision of the Supreme Court in International Shoe v. Washington, 326
US e ao (Q945), state statutes purporting to take advantage of the new tests of juris-
di 1aid down- in that case have been passed. Only a fewv cases have been decided
unds 'these new statutes, but it is believed that these cases show that jurisdiction is more
easily obtained when it is sought for a tort case. Perhaps the clearest illustration of
this'fact is seen in the words of a Vermont court: "Common ideas of justice require
thstw a foreign corporation be subject to, suit in the courts of a state where it does a
to.Yt.us act, when the state so elects, and when the suit is based on such act." Smyth v.
Twin State Improvement Corp., 1x6 Vt. 569, 575, So A.2d 664, 668 (i9s5). Juris-
dicitin was granted by a Maryland court in the case of Johns v. Bay State Abrasive
Plys. Co., 89 F. Supp. 65+ (D. Md. x95o), and again a tort claim was involved.
Apnong the tort cases arising under the piew liberal statutes, only Putnam v. Triangle
Pabocatioqs Inc., 145 N.C. 43Z, 96 S.E.zd 445 (19S7), has denied jurisdiction.
Contract cases arising under the new jurisdictional statutes present a rather different
picte. Jurisdiction was allowed in Compania De Astral S.A. v. Boston Metals Co.,
2,0 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), but this case involved a suit against a foreign
corppration which would have required a suit in a foreign country had jurisdiction not
been granted, and the contacts which this company had within the state were more sub-
stantial than in the tort cases. Aside from this case, jurisdiction has been denied in
contract cases. Florida denied jurisdiction in Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, 246 F.2d
44 (2d Cir. 1957), on the ground that "business venture" was not meant to change the
traditional test of "doing business." Perhaps the reason for this difference between
.contract and tort cases is seen in the words of the court in the Erlanger case, when it
-was aid that in that case the "quality and nature of the acts" did not appear to justify
jurisdiction.. In considering this-distincdpn, however, it would be well to keep in mind
.the.faqtjat the court in the ranger. case Pxpressly denied any difference between tort
,and !!pntract.. It jsiptgcs~ig .tog e x9,that. this denial was made while refusing juris-
diction in a contract case.
[Vol. 19s9: 644
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breach of contract suggests another possible ground for distinguishing
the latter case from Rheem.
It is difficult, however, to find significant factual differences be-
tween the Rheem and Triangle cases. The plaintiff in Triangle sued
a Delaware corporation in a North Carolina state court, alleging libel
and invasion of privacy arising from a statement published in the de-
fendant's magazine. For some time, the defendant had been dis-
tributing magazines to independent wholesalers in North Carolina, who
took tide to and made payment for these magazines outside of that
state. Moreover, the defendant had three men who entered the state
from three to five times a year in order to check sales figures and pro-
mote sales. Jurisdiction was denied by the North Carolina Supreme
Court on the ground that the defendant did not have sufficient contacts
with the state to satisfy due process requirements.
One conceivable basis for distinction between these cases lies in the
difference in the dollar volume of business done by Rheem in North
Carolina in a single year-$I ,685,I 13.92-and that done in the same
length of time by Triangle Publications~-$85,ooo. Both amounts in-
volved are substantial, however, and it would seem less than realistic to
distinguish the cases for this reason. Moreover, a comparison between
money received from the sale of magazines and that from the sale of
stoves probably does not adequately reflect the actual extent of the
contact which these companies have with North Carolina residents. In-
deed, regardless of respective dollar volumes, it is likely that more
North Carolina residents were familiar with Triangle than with Rheem
products.
The two cases could also be distinguished on the basis of the dif-
ference in the nature of the tort sued on in each case. While the Rheem
case dealt with a suit for a personal injury which occurred in a singie
state, the Triangle case involved an alleged libel resulting from publica-
tion of a magazine which was distributed in many states. Since cases in
which a multi-state tort is alleged are difficult for the courts to deal with,
it is understandable that a court might be. more reluctant to extend its
jurisdiction to cover cases of this type. The choice of law problem
which arises in multi-state tort situations, for example, is a problem
which defies satisfactory solution."3 It is impossible to tell whether this
1 Brief for Appellant, p. 7, Putnam v. Triangle Publications Inc., 145 N.C. 432, 96
S.E.zd 445 0957).
13 An indication of the confused state of the law in this area is found, in Warner,
Multistate Publication in Radio and Television, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 14, 19-23
(.958).
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factor influenced the Court in the Triangle case, however, since it was
not mentioned in the court's opinion.
Perhaps the most significant difference between the two cases reposes
in the extent of the activities carried on in North Carolina by the agents
of the two companies. Triangle's agents entered North Carolina five
times a year at most, while three of Rheem's agents solicited fifty to
sixty-five per cent of their orders there, and two of these latter em-
ployees made their home in the state.14  Yet, this difference in the
respective agents' activities also seems insufficient to warrant divergent
conclusions on the constitutional issue of an assertion of jurisdiction in
each case.15 Thus, in view of the similarity of the two cases, it is pos-
sible to conclude that the Rheem case represents a liberal and en-
lightened change in the North Carolina Supreme Court's attitude toward
G.S. 55-I45(a) (3) and jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
Even so, the Rheem case apparently does not push the jurisdictional
power of the state's courts to the outermost bounds of constitutionality.
Indeed, when tested by the United States Supreme Court's recent de-
cision in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,,' an assertion of juris-
diction in the Triangle case would not have extended beyond the ulti-
mate constitutional limits.Y7  In the McGee case, a unanimous Court
held that the single act of mailing a re-insurance certificate to a Cali-
fornia policy holder was enough to give the courts of California juris-
diction over a Texas insurance company,18 even though this was the only
", Neither of the companies had given their agents power to bind the company by
accepting orders. Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, zo6 S.E.2d 704, (x959).
Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 436, 96 S.E.2d 445, 449 (1957).
" If the residence of the agents were considered a distinction between these two cases,
this would lead to the conclusion that Rheem could have avoided jurisdiction merely by
having its agents live outside of North Carolina. This certainly would not make cor-
porate contacts the test of jurisdiction. It is also clear that a distinction as to time
spent in North Carolina by agents would not actually distinguish the contacts which
North Carolina residents had with these companies.
16 335 U.S. 220 (1957).
", The most significant thing about the McGee decision is its fact situation. How-
ever, the following language in the Court's opinion is also significant: "[A] trend is
clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over
foreign corporations and other nonresidents.
"[Of] course there may be inconvenience to the insurer if it is held amenable to
suit in California where it had this contract, but certainly nothing which amounts to a
denial of due process." Id. at 222, 224.
" In 1944 a California resident purchased a life insurance policy from an Arizona
corporation, and in 1948 the International Life Insurance Co. agreed to assume the
insurance obligations of this Arizona corporation. Acting under this agreement, Inter-
national Life mailed a reinsurance certificate to the insured. As far as appears on the
[Vol. x9s9: 644
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contact which the insurance company had had with California.19 Thus,
the McGee case appears to draw the line of constitutionality so as to
encompass easily both the Rheem and the Triangle cases.
Perhaps the Rheem case will mark a turning away from the overly
restrictive approach to the application of G.S. 55-I45(a)(3) which
characterized the Triangle decision. However, since the facts of the
instant case do not require any straining of constitutional dogma for the
application of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation," and since the
North Carolina Supreme Court did not fully articulate its reasons for
distinguishing the Triangle case, it is rather difficult now to assess
accurately the ultimate significance of the Rheem decision.
record, International Life had never solicited or done any insurance business in Cali-
fornia, apart from the policy involved in this case.
1" The fact that the statute which allowed service on this defendant applied to for-
eign insurance companies did not seem to be material to the court's holding, and there is
no language in the opinion which would imply that this reasoning would be applied
solely to insurance companies.
20 It appears that many state courts have stretched the "doing business" concept to
cover activities similar to those of Rheem. A District of Columbia court denied juris-
diction where the agent of the defendant company solicited a substantial portion of his
business there because he did not have the power to make a binding contract. The Court
of Appeals reversed this decision in an excellent opinion which cites many cases for and
against liberal jurisdiction, saying: "[T]he fundamental principle underlying the "doing
business" concept seems to be the maintenance within the jurisdiction of a regular, con-
tinuous course of business activities, whether or not this includes the final stage of con-
tracting." Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., i31 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. '943). This
broad "doing business" concept also appears in William 1. Horlick Co. v. Bogue Elec.
Mfg. Co., 146 F. Supp. 347 (D. Mass. 1956) (solicitation and promotional activities
of a single agent); Orange-Crush Grapico Bottling Co. v. The Seven-Up Co., x28 F.
Supp. 174 (N.D. Ala. 1955) (regular and systematic trips to Alabama by agents); and
Perkins v. Louisville & N.R.R., 94 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Cal. z95i) (office in California
for the purpose of soliciting freight).
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